Monday 28 April 2025
There is a Tigrinya proverb that translates to: “Don’t hold me back; give me my stick, for I have someone to scare.” This sentiment reflects what Ethiopian officials and affiliated media have been expressing recently about Eritrea and the Red Sea. Another saying goes: “This is the field, and this is the horse—now gallop.”
One would think war is imminent if one listens to the war rhetoric from senior Ethiopian officials, including the army chief of staff, the security chief, and other low-ranking military and political figures. Eritrea is generally accustomed to speaking little while silently doing what it needs to do. It is now emboldened by an agreement with Egypt, which does not want Ethiopia to have direct access to the Red Sea. The current unrest in Tigray is driven by a power struggle, further exacerbated by the beating drums of war. In the latest escalation, Tigrayan general Megbay Haile, dismissed by Getachew Reda (a decision not enforced) last week, has been accused by the Ethiopian army of coordinating the Fano uprising. He denied these accusations.
Regional experts are warning of a potential war and urging that it be prevented. These warnings have been expressed by publications such as The Economist, Financial Times, and Chatham House, among others. The Eritrean regime, which has dealt with potential conflicts with neighbouring countries while disregarding international diplomacy, briefed diplomats in Eritrea, stating that Eritrea does not occupy any parts of Ethiopia, does not interfere in Ethiopian affairs, and urged the international community and its relevant bodies to put pressure on Ethiopia to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours.
In his recent speech to Ethiopia’s parliament, Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy, though difficult to trust given his history, denied that Ethiopia would go to war with Eritrea. He emphasised that the issue of Red Sea access remains a matter of survival for Ethiopians, but that Ethiopia is prepared to deter any threats. He also firmly reiterated the importance of Red Sea access, adding that they are just 40 kilometres from the Red Sea and that no one can deny them access to it. Understandably, there will be troop movements and increased mobilisation as both sides anticipate who will fire the first shot under such tense circumstances.
The reason for this prediction of war stems from the unresolved 1998-2000 border war between the two countries, which was left unfinished, with both sides failing to secure a definitive victory.
The reason for this prediction of war stems from the unresolved 1998-2000 border war between the two countries, which was left unfinished, with both sides failing to secure a definitive victory. Ethiopia had the upper hand in the war, controlling large swathes of Eritrean territory, but was either unable or unwilling to march to Asmara and unseat the regime. During that conflict, Isaias ordered his troops to withdraw from Assab, but the Eritrean commander at the front, Osman Saleh, and his colleagues refused to obey the order and defended the Assab front until the end of the war.
General Tsadkan and his colleagues, who split from the TPLF leadership, were critical of Meles Zenawi for not wanting to take Assab, Asmara, or both. They believed it was possible but lacked the political will. Soon after, both the TPLF and the EPLF began to unravel with internal splits, as dissenters accused their leadership of mishandling the war, among other issues. While the EPLF dissenters disappeared and their whereabouts have remained unknown since 2001, the TPLF dissenters were simply removed from their positions, a few imprisoned for a couple of years, and allowed to pursue their political activities, highlighting the different approaches taken by the two organisations.
Vengeful, Isaias waited for the right moment to teach the TPLF a lesson and finish them off. The opportunity came when prime minister Abiy took power in Ethiopia, and both sides considered the TPLF to be an arch-enemy. What followed was the devastating Tigray war of 2020–2022. The deterioration of relations between Abiy and Isaias began during the Tigray war. Abiy’s concession to pressure from Western countries—allowing some journalists to visit the war zone, permitting humanitarian assistance, and, most significantly, when Abiy withdrew his troops from Mekelle in June 2021 without informing Asmara—was seen as a betrayal by Isaias. When the war resumed, both sides joined forces against the TPLF but were unable to dislodge it. The Pretoria agreement, which allowed the TPLF to remain in power in Mekelle, was the final straw that broke the camel’s back in their relationship.
In one of his private speeches, he [Abiy] warned that he could turn Eritrea into Gaza if provoked.
Their deteriorating relationship is closely tied to regional politics and power struggles, primarily centred on Ethiopia’s obsession with regaining access to the Red Sea—a strategic asset it lost in 1991 following Eritrea’s independence. Behind closed doors, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly held the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) responsible for accepting Eritrea’s secession. He has also reportedly accused Eritrea of obstructing the Pretoria peace agreement, which ended Ethiopia’s civil war last year. In one of his private speeches, he warned that he could turn Eritrea into Gaza if provoked. Ethiopia has openly hosted some Eritrean opposition groups, including an Afar organisation, a branch of Birged N’Hamedu, and an organisation that calls itself the Eritrean Government in Exile. Eritrea is also accused of supporting the Fano—an Amhara-based insurgency—without officially declaring it.
The EPRDF rule has seen double-digit economic growth (Africa’s fastest growing economy at one point) since Ethiopia lost access to Eritrean ports in 1998, which had put Ethiopia’s obsession with securing Red Sea access on hold or rendered it dormant. Abiy reignited this obsession, opening a Pandora’s box and planting the idea in the minds of a new generation of Ethiopians. On October 13, Ethiopian media broadcast a previously recorded speech by Abiy to parliament. In it, Abiy emphasised the critical role the Red Sea plays in Ethiopia’s future, describing it as a factor that could either elevate the nation to greatness or lead to its downfall. He also reaffirmed Ethiopia’s ambition to establish a naval base, noting that a maritime force had already been formed. Agreements have been made with France and, more recently, Russia, to develop a navy despite Ethiopia’s lack of direct sea access. Interestingly, the Russian vice-admiral of the navy visited Eritrea in early 2024 and held extensive discussions with the Eritrean president and army officials.
Abiy emphasised the critical role the Red Sea plays in Ethiopia’s future, describing it as a factor that could either elevate the nation to greatness or lead to its downfall.
Wars are not new to the region, which has experienced conflict in several parts due to a prevalent culture of violence. These conflicts escalated following the advent of Italian colonialism in 1890, with thousands of Eritreans mobilised to fight Italy’s wars in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Libya. One of the most devastating battles of the time was the Battle of Adwa in 1896, with heavy losses on both sides. Italy sought revenge against Ethiopia in 1935, committing atrocities, including the use of poison gas, in its attempt to occupy the country. The start of the Eritrean armed struggle in 1961 encouraged Ethiopian liberation movements in Tigray and other parts of Ethiopia, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Haile Selassie regime, and the defeat of the Mengistu regime in 1991.
The civil war in Sudan, which flared intermittently since its independence in 1956, led to millions of deaths and displacements, eventually resulting in the independence of South Sudan in 2012 and the ongoing devastating war in Sudan since April 2023. The fall of Siad Barre's regime the same year plunged Somalia into turmoil, leading to Somaliland declaring its state without international recognition. Independent Eritrea has been at war with all of its neighbours since its declaration of statehood.
The faction led by Debretsion has taken control from the interim administration in the capital, Mekelle, and several other towns, with military support in what could be described as a “silent coup d'état”.
The current escalation of war rhetoric between Eritrea and Ethiopia is compounded by the ongoing power struggle between TPLF factions in Tigray, which has been simmering since the Pretoria peace agreement between the federal government and the TPLF. The faction led by Debretsion has taken control from the interim administration in the capital, Mekelle, and several other towns, with military support in what could be described as a “silent coup d'état”. Getachew Reda, General Tsadkan, other officials, and many youths have left Tigray.
Debretsion’s faction is believed to be aligned with Eritrea, while the Getachew Reda faction is closer to Ethiopia’s prime minister. The factions have openly accused each other of these allegiances. The power struggle has several dimensions. One is ideological: the Debretsion faction sees the TPLF and the Tigrayans as one, asserting that to save the people, the priority must be to preserve its vanguard, the TPLF. This faction is primarily supported by veteran TPLF leaders and the people in the countryside in some regions of Tigray, who have known no other party for the last 50 years. They view the Tigray forces as the military wing of the party.
The Getachew Reda faction is supported by younger, more educated individuals who believe that the TPLF has dominated political life in Tigray for too long. They seek a new political course, free from the TPLF, and advocate for an independent military, separate from the party, thus separating the state from the party. They envision the formation of a broader alliance, with different political persuasions involved in governing the state. The conflict also has a regional dimension, with the TPLF being dominated by leaders from Adwa and Axum, while other regions desire better representation. There is also an economic dimension, centred on control of the country’s gold resources, with some generals heavily involved in extracting and smuggling gold via Eritrea and Addis Ababa to Dubai. This unregulated extraction is believed to be causing environmental destruction. Prior to the war, Tigray was one of the biggest suppliers of gold to the National Bank of Ethiopia, contributing around 2.6 metric tonnes annually, valued at approximately $100 million. Now, most of the gold is smuggled out of the region. The generals appear more concerned with their own benefits and power struggles than with addressing Tigray’s ongoing humanitarian crisis.
Eritrea and the TPLF are supporting the Sudanese army (SAF) in its fight against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. It is estimated that at least two brigades of the TPLF, which were previously in Sudan, are now fighting alongside the Sudanese army on the ground, potentially tipping the balance of the fight in the army’s favour. According to informed sources, the Sudanese military may later assist the TPLF in taking Western Tigray by force and in opening a corridor to Sudan. However, Eritrea would not support this move, as it prefers a TPLF that has no direct access to Sudan.
Despite all the war rhetoric, the prospect of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is concerning but does not appear imminent. The Ethiopian army has been exhausted from fighting its own people in Tigray for two years and in the Amhara and Oromia regions for several years. The Tigrayan people are weary from the previous conflict, and the youth may not be willing to fight new battles. The Eritrean army is also in poor condition. However, the characteristics of Isaias and prime minister Abiy may set the stage for disaster, and as warned by two western diplomat familiar with the region, “Eritrea and Ethiopia have veered from hostility to cooperation and now—ominously—toward the brink of war.” Wars in the region often defy logic, and every effort must be made to avert a new conflict.