The al-Shabaab reaction to the rise of HTS in Syria

The events of December 2024 astonished the world. The supposedly powerful Assad regime fell after a brief offensive by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies. HTS began as a union of several groups in 2017, with the largest of these being the al-Nusra Front. The al-Nusra Front, in turn, had been part of the al-Qaida network, joining only a year after Harakat al-Shabaab, which became part of al-Qaeda in 2012. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida’s global leader at the time, posted a video message welcoming al-Shabaab, where he said they were joining the group to support “jihadi unity against the Zio-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers”.

For several years, the two groups were the largest (al-Nusra) and second largest (al-Shabaab) organisations in the al-Qaida network. However, by renaming the al-Nusra Front to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and renouncing al-Qaida ties in 2016, followed by the merger with three other groups to form HTS in 2017, the current HTS leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, chose a different trajectory to that of the current al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed ‘Diirye’ aka Umar Abu Ubaidah.

Given the different trajectories of the two organisations, how did al-Shabaab view the Syrian uprising and HTS? Drawing on sources from al-Shabaab’s Radio al-Andalus broadcasts, as well as one of the major outlets of al-Shabaab propaganda like Wacdaro Media, this article aims to provide a snapshot of al-Shabaab’s reactions. It covers the period from late November 2024 to 11 January 2025.

Al-Shabaab’s propaganda in December-January  

It should be clear that al-Shabaab’s propaganda is primarily locally directed, with a strong emphasis on Somalia. The conflict between Somaliland, Somalia, and Ethiopia, the standoff in Jubaland, al-Shabaab’s distribution of aid to the needy, and depictions of attacks, including the assassinations of ‘traitors’ in Mogadishu, are the most common themes aimed at a local audience.

However, the fall of the Assad regime was the most extensively covered international event in al-Shabaab propaganda. Admittedly, al-Shabaab outlets also extensively covered both the Taliban implementation of Sharia (including the stoning of an adulterer), the killing of Taliban minister, Khalil Rahman Haqqani, by the Islamic State, as well as the Taliban-Pakistani clashes. Al-Shabaab took a clear side in the latter conflict, claiming that the Taliban had clashed with what it called “non-believers”.

Only two other regions received attention during this period: Mali and Yemen. Coverage was limited to a single article on the successes of Mali’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an obituary for a deceased leader of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the republishing of AQAP’s congratulations to the Sunnis of Syria following the fall of Assad. The latter somewhat mirrored al-Shabaab’s own narratives on the events in Syria, which are described below.

The coverage of the overthrow of Assad

Despite the large-scale ramifications of the events in Syria, al-Shabaab’s December coverage of Syria began very modestly with a small note posted on the Wacdaro media on 2 December. This notification was the aforementioned AQAP letter congratulating the ‘Sunni’ forces of Syria on their great successes. The subsequent coverage of Syria took the form of news bulletins. The news notifications from al-Shabaab highlighted the technological skills of HTS, commenting on the successes of HTS’s drone forces, especially in their anti-tank use. The more radical Syrian group Ansar al-Tawheed received praise from al-Shabaab, especially for a suicide attack in the Khadabi district of the Hama region on 5th December. Al-Shabaab also celebrated the liberation of the notorious Sednaya prison from the Assad regime on 8 December. They ‘celebrated’ the event by publishing explicit pictures of prison guards who were beaten by what appears to be Syrian civilians.

The articles above are examples of al-Shabaab’s narratives during the first weeks of December 2024. Al-Shabaab celebrates the victory over the Assad regime, praises the technical competence of HTS in their drone warfare, and acknowledges Ansar al-Tawheed—an organisation that maintained its al-Qaida links longer than HTS, but has since distanced itself from the latter. al-Shabaab uses the word ‘jihadist’ when commenting on Ansar al-Tawheed, and when describing some of the actions of HTS (without mentioning the latter’s name). However, HTS is not praised directly, and there are no direct congratulations to HTS. There are simply no direct celebrations of HTS, only of the general victories over the Assad regime. For al-Shabaab, it seems the ‘jihadists’ of Syria do not belong to any particular organisation, save for their single article on the suicide bombings carried out by Ansar al-Tawheed. Importantly, there is no attempt by al-Shabaab to distance itself from HTS; they simply ignore the group’s name.

This tone changes somewhat in the middle of December 2025. Al-Shabaab published a news article on the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Syria, claiming that the UAE had attempted to implement a grand plan to divide Syria into three, but that it failed in its efforts. The report might have more to do with events in Somalia than Syria. In Somalia, the UAE have pursued a federalist agenda and have a generally anti-Islamist stance in their foreign policy. Al-Shabaab also published an article on the life of Syrian jihadi ideologue Abu Mus’ab al-Suri in early January 2025. However, the focus on Syria declined drastically after December.

The praise of the technical achievements of HTS was notable in the early coverage, yet the limited praise of the organisation itself was also striking. Furthermore, it seems that scepticism towards HTS increased in December, as illustrated by the article on UAE manipulations and indeed on Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri is presented as a real example of a Syrian jihadist to be followed, and thus an example for Syrian jihadists that should inspire their actions. This can be interpreted as an al-Shabaab attempt to bolster the more radical part of the Syrian rebellion, by praising a more radical, and famous, al-Qaida member. Al-Suri had a clear global agenda that seemingly lacks in HTS today. In December, al-Sharaa told the Times his country wouldn’t be used as a “launchpad for attacks” against any state, including Israel. He hasn’t deviated from this line. It can also be seen as a way of allowing more radical organisations to take credit for the victories in Syria, by highlighting that there have been famous global jihadists from Syria before, without stating that al-Qaida’s role in the current events in Syria is seemingly minimal today. Such a narrative could also be valuable for a Somali audience, presenting a story where the al-Qaida network is still relevant in Syria today, although this is not the case.

Yet, al-Shabaab never condemned HTS. In the words of an al-Shabaab propaganda leader, they were uncertain about the organisation's intentions and its interactions with other powers in the Middle East. Al-Shabaab was confused, but hopeful, and remains so today. The change in the profile of HTS and its more local focus might also have been seen as dangerous to al-Shabaab, inspiring leaders to distance the group from the al-Qaida network, and even to seek cooperation with more secular organisations.  

However, al-Shabaab leaders, both senior and mid-ranking, are well-informed about international events, including the situation in Syria, and the trajectory of HTS—a group that left al-Qaida and seemingly became more secular—will have an impact, including on internal discussions within al-Shabaab.