Afwerki's Sudan bet

In Sudan’s turbulent landscape, the role of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki does not appear as fleeting or marginal. Rather, he emerges as a highly sensitive regional actor attuned to balances of power, operating from the position of a geographically small state, yet one dense with political memory and deeply anxious about its security, borders, and place within the equations of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

For Afwerki, Sudan has never been merely a neighbor; it has been a space of historical, security, and political entanglement, and a strategic corridor where Eritrea’s long-standing fears of Ethiopia intersect with its contemporary calculations vis-à-vis Arab and regional powers.

Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Isaias Afwerki’s relationship with Sudan has been shaped by a long legacy of tension and mutual suspicion. During the years of the National Salvation regime under Omar al-Bashir, Khartoum hosted, at various times, Eritrean Islamist opposition groups and opened its territory to military and political activities that Asmara regarded as a direct threat to its national security. In response, Eritrea did not hesitate to support Sudanese opposition movements, particularly in eastern Sudan, turning the eastern border into a zone of low-intensity but persistent conflict.

This phase laid the foundation for Afwerki’s view of Sudan as a state that could be either a bulwark or a vulnerable flank, depending on the nature of the ruling authority in Khartoum.

With the transformations Sudan underwent after 2019, Afwerki appeared to read the new scene through a different lens. The fall of the Bashir regime theoretically removed one of the traditional sources of hostility, but at the same time it opened the door to chaos and uncertainty – developments that the Eritrean leadership, by its nature, deeply fears.

A state born of a long war and governed through a rigid security mindset views any loosening of control along its borders with acute anxiety. From this perspective, it was unsurprising that Afwerki leaned toward supporting Sudan’s military institution, which he saw as the actor most capable of preserving state cohesion and preventing a slide into disintegration akin to what occurred in Somalia or Libya.

The relationship between Isaias Afwerki and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan evolved not merely as a personal rapport, but as a partnership grounded in a clear convergence of interests. Al-Burhan, coming from a traditional military background, appeared to Afwerki as closer to a model he understands and prefers: a state led by the army, one that prioritizes security over politics and remains wary of rapid civilian transitions. The repeated meetings between the two men, whether in Asmara or Khartoum, reflected this convergence and reinforced Afwerki’s conviction that al-Burhan represents the least risky option for Sudan’s stability, and consequently for Eritrea’s security.

By contrast, Isaias Afwerki’s stance toward the Rapid Support Forces was marked from the outset by reservation, if not outright hostility. A force that emerged outside the traditional military structure and expanded rapidly through a war economy and tribal and regional alliances represents, in Afwerki’s view, a model of armed chaos the region knows all too well.

Eritrea, which fought a long war to unify arms under a strict central authority, looks unfavorably upon any parallel military formation outside the state. Consequently, the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), never enjoyed Asmara’s trust, politically or security-wise, especially given its broad openness to multiple regional and international actors, some of whom run counter to Afwerki’s calculations in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

The position on the war

With the outbreak of war between the Sudanese army and the RSF, Isaias Afwerki adopted a cautious public stance, but one that was clear in substance. He did not openly declare support for either side, yet he maintained open channels with al-Burhan and presented himself as a potential mediator, without concealing his belief that a military victory for the army would be the outcome most consistent with his vision of stability.

This position reflects Afwerki’s broader political philosophy which rejects armed pluralism and a bets on the central state, even at the expense of democratic transition. For him, the war in Sudan is not merely a struggle over power, but a test of the state’s very survival, and any outcome leading to the fragmentation of central authority would reverberate negatively across the entire region.

Afwerki’s view of Sudan closely intersects with his complex relationship with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Despite the alliance forged after the Eritrea–Ethiopia peace agreement of 2018, that partnership has remained governed more by caution and mutual interests than by deep trust. Here, Sudan assumes critical importance. On one hand, it represents a geographic and political depth that can balance Ethiopian influence in the region; on the other, it is a space through which threats could seep if it slips out of control. The border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia in al-Fashaga, and the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, have made Sudan an indispensable actor in the equation between Asmara and Addis Ababa.

Afwerki believes that a stable Sudan aligned with Eritrea could serve as an indirect pressure card on Ethiopia, or at least as a balancing factor preventing Addis Ababa from monopolizing leadership of the Horn of Africa. Conversely, a weak or divided Sudan could turn into a security burden or a sphere of influence for forces Afwerki does not wish to see on his borders – whether Islamist groups, transnational militias, or excessive Ethiopian influence.

Thus, Isaias Afwerki’s role in Sudan is driven less by expansionist ambition than by a deep existential anxiety. Sudan, in his view, is not simply a troubled neighbor but a frontline against fragmentation and the return of regional chaos

From that perspective, Sudan becomes a cornerstone of Afwerki’s regional strategy, not only in his dealings with Ethiopia, but in shaping Eritrea’s position as a whole. This expands further when viewed through the lens of the Red Sea equation, where the interests of Egypt, Eritrea, Turkey, and Sudan intersect. Afwerki understands that the Red Sea is no longer merely a shipping lane, but a theater of intense international and regional competition.

Egypt, anxious about the expansion of Ethiopian influence due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, finds in Eritrea and Sudan potential partners in securing its southern and eastern flanks. Eritrea, in turn, sees coordination with Cairo as an opportunity to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Addis Ababa and to gain political and economic support after years of international isolation. Turkey, which in recent years has sought to expand its presence in the Red Sea – first through Sudan and then more broadly across the Horn of Africa – is another actor firmly within Afwerki’s calculations.

A leader who built his system on independence and rejection of external tutelage, Afwerki views any Turkish expansion that might alter regional power balances with caution. Once again, Sudan forms the pivotal link in this equation, its geography, coastline, and internal crisis make it an open arena for competition – either as part of an axis including Egypt and Eritrea, or as a gateway for other influences.

Thus, Isaias Afwerki’s role in Sudan is driven less by expansionist ambition than by a deep existential anxiety. Sudan, in his view, is not simply a troubled neighbor but a frontline against fragmentation and the return of regional chaos. This logic underpins his implicit backing of the Sudanese army, his rejection of armed pluralism embodied by the RSF, and his preference for a strong, centralized state capable of enforcing order.

Coordinating with Egypt and managing a cautious relationship with Ethiopia, Afwerki sees a stable Sudan as a strategic pillar in the balance of power across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Though often at odds with democratic aspirations, this approach is fully consistent with Afwerki’s worldview, one shaped in Asmara by hard security calculations, where stability outweighs fragility, and power, not ideals, defines survival.