Abiy Ahmed visits Lido Beach following Somali sea access row

The image released during Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent trip to Mogadishu alongside Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was striking. Yet, it was unclear exactly what it was attempting to convey. Mohamud stood next to Abiy Ahmed on a balcony overlooking Lido Beach, with the vast Indian Ocean stretching out behind them. It wasn't missed by a young reporter for Dalsan TV, who noted that Abiy Ahmed’s country was landlocked as the prime minister headed across town to the seaside that day. “Ethiopia is a country without any kind of a beach,” the reporter said.  

In a caption attached to the image, shared by Sandokan Debebe, Abiy’s chief of staff, Debebe wrote: “The future will be #bright for our nation.” Was something agreed upon? Why does the notion of a bright future for the nation seem to be tethered to the Indian Ocean? As usual, the readout following the meeting wasn’t all that illuminating. Both leaders released tersely worded statements, committing to “strengthening cooperation for mutual benefit.”  

For nearly a year, the leaders in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa had been at each other's throats, their rhetoric escalating from threats of war to labelling one another terrorists and the enemies. The issue Somalia faced was directly related to what we saw in the image—Mogadishu argued that Ethiopia had inappropriately engaged with Somaliland, signing a memorandum which if implemented would give it access to the Gulf of Aden, and in exchange, Ethiopia would formally recognise Hargeisa’s independence declaration. The long-feared prospect of a Somalia divided in two had finally become a real possibility, now compounded by the added threat of an Ethiopian naval presence off Somaliland’s coast. In a moment of unexpected candour, Somaliland’s then-defence minister, Abdiqani Mohamud Ateye, declared his opposition to the move during an interview with Horyaal TV in which he referred to Ethiopia as an occupier of Somali territory and branded it the country’s “number one enemy.” That sentiment would quickly spread among the public.  

It was a moment of alarm for officials in Mogadishu and for many Somalis, and Mohamud seemed to rise to the occasion, rallying the public behind him as he launched a diplomatic offensive, designed to pressure Abiy into publicly voiding the agreement. In their public communications, his officials broke several taboos of Somali politics, acknowledging, first, that al-Shabaab largely emerged in reaction to Ethiopia’s post-2006 invasion of Mogadishu, that Somalia’s border with Ethiopia is not a settled matter, and that Addis Ababa retains imperial designs on the Horn of Africa region. No Somali politician could have dreamed uttering any such words in the years prior. Mohamud even threatened to eject Ethiopia from the African Union peacekeeping mission and seemed to have earnestly planned for a future without Ethiopia’s presence. From his pulpit on Fridays, where Mohamud regularly addressed worshippers at a mosque, the president had transformed into a blue-blooded Somali nationalist. 

The come down began with Turkey’s intervention last autumn. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered his good offices to mediate between the bickering neighbours and provide a way out. Ankara has significant commercial and military interests in both countries and is a respected partner. It appeared that the combined effort of Erdoğan and his foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, succeeded in first getting the two leaders talking, then outlining their respective issues before a tête-à-tête was arranged, during which the Ankara declaration was signed.

Mogadishu and Addis Ababa slowly normalised relations, restoring diplomatic ties first in January, and then securing a place for Ethiopian troops in the African Union support and stabilization mission in Somalia (Aussom). 

A lingering concern was the status of the initial memorandum which sparked the diplomatic crisis. As of yet, Ethiopia hasn’t affirmed its commitment to it nor has it renounced it, and reporting has been mixed. Tom Gardner, the Economist’s Africa correspondent, quoted a Somali official who said it had been “retracted”. While Ismail Shirwac, a Somaliland official said “Ethiopia has firmly insisted NOT to withdraw from the MoU”.

The Somali ambassador to Ethiopia, Abdullahi Warfa, felt that his country had been given enough assurance, stating that both countries had agreed to “implement a one-door policy,” signalling that Abiy’s government would no longer work behind or around Somalia to secure its interests.

Whatever the status of that memorandum, a subsequent statement from the Ethiopian army’s chief of staff has since rung alarm bells. Birhanu Jula, speaking at an event commemorating Adwa Victory Day told an audience: “It is only a matter of time before we become a member of the Red Sea Community”. He echoed a threatening phrase by Abiy Ahmed in 2023, saying: “We hope our national interest will be secured through peaceful means”. 

Ethiopia’s intelligence chief, Redwan Hussien, made a similar comment, complaining that Ethiopia was a victim of a historical injustice and that now was the time to “fulfil it and have access to the sea”. His view, like Jula’s, was that the drama surrounding the memorandum had provided his country with a window of opportunity, which should not be wasted. 

It isn’t clear if his officials are being loose-lipped like the British ambassador to the US, Peter Mandelson, who was reprimanded by his government after offering his personal view that Ukraine should “commit to a ceasefire” before Russia. But the UK made clear that his remarks didn’t reflect government policy in a way that Ethiopia hasn’t with Jula or Hussein. Abiy was also apparently reluctant to include a sentence in the Ankara declaration affirming Addis Ababa’s commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity. 

Twitter users will have noticed the growing circulation of maps of Eritrea and Ethiopia on the platform, maps that either seek to re-litigate the question of Ethiopia’s access to Eritrea’s Assab port or depict parts of southern Eritrea wholly annexed by Ethiopia.

The Egyptians and Eritreans, who have their own issues with Abiy Ahmed, do not appear to be taking any chances. Badr Abdelatty, Egypt’s foreign minister, visited Asmara where he was given an audience with Isaias Afwerki. They discussed “developments in the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Libya and the Red Sea.” There wasn’t Somali representation at the meeting, but Abdelatty pointed out in January that his country believes it is “completely unacceptable to allow any military or naval presence by non-littoral states.” That was a nod to Abiy. But it doesn’t seem to have dampened his appetite for sea access, the new north star of his foreign policy.

Eritrea doesn’t have the benefit of distance that Cairo does and has declared a nationwide military mobilisation, according to BBC Amharic. Residents of Asmara have said men under 60 have been forbidden from leaving the country and former members of the army have been recalled for training. Both sides have also resorted to their old tactics of giving refuge to one another’s opposition groups. “Against this backdrop, the prospect of a full-scale war cannot – and should not – be discounted,” write Clingendael researchers, Amanuel Dessalegn Gedebo and Guido Lanfranchi. If tensions between the neighbours truly come to a head, while it may be easy for Egypt to pick a side, Somalia could well find itself left in the lurch.

The deescalation process between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa on the other hand is ongoing, and both countries committed to improving ties during Abiy's visit. The recent Ethiopian airstrike against al-Shabaab targets in Middle Shabelle that defence minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur announced are a sign that that relations have turned a corner. The new administration in Hargeisa also offers an opportunity for a fresh start without the political baggage of the Muse Bihi years. However, Abiy’s reasoning and his aims remain unsettlingly unclear, leaving any rapprochement on fragile ground.