Abdirahman Badiyow “I want us to reconcile religion, clan, and statehood”

Somali studies have been shaped by various intellectual schools of thought, each employing different methods to analyse Somali society. These studies focus on the social, historical, political, religious, and socio-economic realities of the Somali people, often through conflicting viewpoints.

Early research on Somalis was dominated by Western scholars, who were driven by colonial and hegemonic interests. Their work generated significant debate and criticism from many who felt their perspectives were biased and served an agenda of cultural suppression and colonial control. This gave rise to different schools of thought, each critiquing the others and exposing their flaws. This intellectual ferment led to new, influential ideas in Somali studies.

Born in 1954, Dr Abdirahman Abdullahi Badiyow, a prominent scholar, author and civil socio-political activist, is one of the most influential voices in this field. He has a unique background that combines his experience as a former military officer and electronic engineer with his work as a scholar of modern Islamic history and a public intellectual.

In his studies, Dr Badiyow has contributed valuable insights into the social, political, religious, and governmental crises that have plagued Somalia over the last three decades.

As one of the leading figures in Somali studies, Dr Badiyow is best known for his “Comprehensive Perspective”, an intellectual framework that aims to reconcile, in his view, the two core pillars of Somali identity: clan and Islam, with modern statehood.

In this interview for Geeska, Dr Badiyow discusses the different schools of thought in Somali studies. He details how his perspective developed, its place within Somali studies, and how it differs from other theories.

He also addresses the conflict between tribalism, religion, and modern statehood, a topic he explored in depth in his master's thesis, Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: The Crisis of Political Loyalty in Somalia.

Badiyow further highlights the conflict between Islamist and non-Islamist elites, emphasising that their disagreements are rooted in differing views on the nature of the Somali state. He points out that the political culture of these elites has weakened state institutions, leading to despair and an uncertain future.

Moreover, he challenges the common argument that the “modern nation-state” and “clan” are incompatible, asserting that this idea is a colonial concept linked to modernisation theory. He concludes with advice for young people interested in Somali studies, encouraging them to critically read and engage with his work and to contribute their own ideas.

Ahmed Hisam Mido: To begin our interview, Somali studies contain various schools of thought that studied the Somali people in different ways. How does your comprehensive perspective differ from these schools? Through what lenses do you study the Somali people?

Abdirahman Baadiyow: Thank you. When studying history, you use different schools and philosophical methods. The first scholars to study the Somali people were Western academics driven by colonial and hegemonic interests. Early on, Somalia was studied through an anthropological lens which aimed to understand the culture, language, and religion of colonised peoples in order to control them more effectively.

This school was pioneered by the British social anthropologist I. M. Lewis (1930–2014) and was supported by both Somali and foreign scholars. This perspective was based on the idea that the "culture" of colonised people was inherently bad. The Westerners saw themselves as civilised and other peoples as backward and uncivilised, believing that their traditional way of life could not keep pace with modernity. They advocated for the adoption of Western culture and introduced Modernisation Theory, which called for the "civilisation" of other peoples and the transformation of their way of life to align with the West.

The idea was embraced by early liberation movements, such as the Somali Youth League (SYL), which immediately pushed to fight against tribalism. At the same time, the role of religion was confined to religious schools and centres. However, everything changed when the military government took over and, with its socialist ideology, crushed both Islam and tribalism, which are fundamental to the Somali social structure.

This anthropological school fought against the Somali way of life and dominated the social consciousness, influencing many Somali politicians and intellectuals who believed that following the Western path was the only way to build a state. When the military government came to power and adopted socialism, another school, the Marxist school, emerged to oppose the anthropological view, and many Somalis and foreigners embraced this perspective.

Marxist thought is based on a class system, but many scholars applied it to Somalis even though Somali society lacked distinct classes or a wealthy elite. Later on, this perspective failed because the government abandoned socialism in the 1980s, and eventually, the Soviet Union, which represented this ideology, collapsed.

After the collapse of the state, a group of scholars emerged who were outraged by how the Somali population who speak the Maay dialect had been effaced, looked down on, and marginalised. Thus, they introduced a new revisionist school of thought, arguing that Somali history was primarily written from the perspective of the camel-herding nomads who came to power, not from a perspective that represented all Somalis. They highlighted that the history and rule of the camel herders went hand in hand. They also showed how this history excluded the Maay-speaking people and many others living in Southern Somalia.

While this group did not introduce a new philosophy, they succeeded in bringing a new focus to the discussion. Their efforts led to the Maay dialect being written into the Somali constitution alongside the popular Maxaatiri dialect, the inclusion of the Maay-speaking people in the 4.5 power-sharing formula, and the establishment of the South West State.

After studying these schools, I realised that one of them, the revisionist one, was a local argument, while the other two were imported from the West and East. I became certain that these perspectives were not truly Somali. This is how my comprehensive perspective came about. I started this in 1989 while I was a student at McGill University's Institute of Islamic Studies in Canada. Hence, the reality of Somalis is this: 1) they are undeniably tribal, and 2) they are Muslim. These two identities are the foundation of the Somali people, and they are what my comprehensive perspective is based on. They are also the two identities that some of the other schools of thought fought against.

This can be achieved by integrating these three Somali identities to establish a solid foundation for statehood. That is a summary of my comprehensive perspective; more details can be found in my study.

AM: You linked the root of Somalia's collapse to the struggle between tribalism, religion, and modern statehood. Could you elaborate on the origin of this conflict?

AB: The conflict was caused by a governmental system we inherited from the colonial powers, which grew into a tyranny. When we talk about the state, we are talking about the elite trained by the colonisers, who inherited their way of thinking. This elite fought against both the clan and religion, especially the military government, which crushed both. This war caused the clan to become radicalised, leading to the formation of militias that dismantled the state. Similarly, some Islamic groups, angered by the war against religion, also became radicalised, took up arms, and joined the fight against the military government.

When the centralised Somali state collapsed, the only remaining forces were that of clan and religion. This led to devastating clan warfare and conflicts between religious leaders and the tribes. The conflict between these three started when a state ruled by elites who did not understand the Somali way of life became overly aggressive, which caused people to grow suspicious about and turn their backs on the idea of a strong and stable state. Why? Because the trauma of a consolidated state power still lingers in people's minds.

AM: In your study, Theorizing Stability of the Somali State, you mentioned that the conflicting groups in Somalia include the social elites. Can you explain who they are and what their conflict is about?

AB: The study explains that before colonialism, there were two elites: traditional elders and traditional religious leaders, who didn't have a major conflict since each had a distinct role. After colonialism, two new modern elites emerged: Islamists and non-Islamists. There is a huge conflict between these latter, and its root lies in the "nature of the state" they want to rule Somalis with. The Islamists want an Islamic state or a state that adheres to Islamic principles (I'm talking about rational Islamists, not the armed extremists). The non-Islamists want a state inherited from the colonial powers, based on Western philosophical principles. The foundation of their conflict and their inability to accept one another is their differing views on the nature of the state.

AM: In your views, the political elites have failed and have created a political culture that has hindered the state-building process and led to social decay. Can you tell us about the political culture that is preventing the country's reconstruction?

AB: The North and South were colonised by the British and Italians. The British practised a weak form of indirect rule and empowered the clan infrastructure. The Italians were different. At one point, they were a Fascist regime (1923–1941) that forced the Italian culture, language, and rule on the people. Later, the Somalis were being prepared for statehood. The elites in the South adopted the Italian culture, which was characterised by widespread division, corruption, bribery, and political tribalism. In addition, Somali culture had many inherent flaws. This led to the creation of four political cultures: 1) clan politics, 2) politics of plunder, 3) foreign-driven politics, where foreign governments are used against one another, and 4) commercialised politics, where everything is for sale. This political culture is preventing the establishment of a genuine and stable state and is crippling state-building efforts.

AM: You argue that it's essential to reconcile clan, religion, and modern statehood to build a stable Somali state. However, some Somali scholars argue that "nation-state" and "clan" are inherently incompatible. What is your response to that argument?

AB: Those are people who believe in the Western concept of "modernising" societies, which called for discarding traditional cultures, and that's not possible. It is important to remember that clan will continue to exist in Somalia. Therefore, it cannot be "eliminated." It must be organised and kept in its appropriate place. We don't want to politicise the clan, and we need a mechanism to prevent that. This requires research and thinking on how to integrate clan, religion, and statehood. We are forced to reconcile these three if we want a stable and prosperous state.

AM: Lastly, what advice do you have for young people interested in Somali studies?

AB: First, they must know that a correct idea leads to a correct and sound action. If the idea is correct, the state and life will be corrected. Somalia's stagnation is due to believing in the wrong ideas. My advice is to read and to look at things with a critical eye. I especially suggest that my perspective be read, debated, studied, and critiqued. If something is missing, it should be added, corrected, and completed so that we can create the right idea to build a Somali state. I want us to create a new vision that can reconcile religion, clan, and statehood.